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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioners respectfully refer the Court to the detailed Statement of Facts set forth in 
Petitioners' opening brief. See Brief of Petitioners at 5-11. 
ARGUMENT 
The primary issue in this case is whether the July 31, 2000, decision of the 
Department of Workforce Services (the "Department"), which found Gaylen Harris 
("Harris") is Petitioners' employee for purposes of the Utah Employment Security Act (the 
"Act"), is "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court." Tasters Ltd v. Department of Employment Sec, 863 P.2d 12,18 (UtahCt. 
App. 1993), cert den. 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994). As set forth in Petitioners' opening brief, 
and as addressed in Respondents' opposition brief, whether an individual is excluded from 
coverage under the Act depends on whether the individual is (A) engaged in an independent 
trade and (B) free from control and direction of the employer. See Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-
204(3)(a) & (b). 
A. Engagement in Independent Trade 
The Department's July 31, 2000, decision found Harris was Petitioners' employee 
because he was not engaged in an independent trade. R. at 51-55. Whether one is engaged 
in an independent trade is determined under seven factors set forth at Utah Administrative 
Code R994-204-303(2)(b). As necessitated by Respondents' brief, each factor is addressed 
in turn. 
1 
The first factor, separate place of business, was established by Harris' testimony that 
he considered his home as a place of business. R. at 50(38:21-41). Indeed, Respondents 
found Harris had a home office, see e.g. R. at 52, 190-91. The Respondents' brief even 
concedes Harris' "home might be considered an independent place of business." Brief of 
Respondents at 9. 
The second factor is whether the individual "has a substantial investment in the tools 
equipment, or facilities customarily required to perform the services." Utah Admin. Code 
R994-204-303(2)(b)(ii) (emphasis added). Respondents inaccurately attempt to shift the 
focus to "whether or not the individual supplied the tools and equipment" for his services. 
Brief of Respondents at 9 (emphasis added). This is not the consideration set forth in the 
rules, regardless of how "insignificant" Respondents deem the materials required by one in 
Harris' profession. The irrefutable testimony before the Department was Harris owned all 
the equipment necessary to perform his services. R. at 15; 50(38:21-23); and 50(38:37 to 
39:20). 
Third, whether the individual had other clients, was also established by Harris' 
testimony. Nonetheless, Respondents speculate "it was more likely [Harris did not seek 
additional clients] because he was required to work for Petitioner 40 hours per work." Brief 
of Respondents at 9. Regardless of Respondents' interjection of motive completely 
unsupported by any record evidence, see id., Harris' absolutely unrebutted testimony was it 
is not unusual for a freelance accountant to work for one client. R. at 50(49:21-24). 
2 
The fourth consideration is ability of the individual to suffer a profit or loss. Contrary 
to Respondents' characterization of Petitioners' argument, it was asserted this factor was of 
little relevance, not meaningless. It is true, as Respondents suggest, some professionals such 
as attorneys are able to realize a profit by performing flat-fee type work. See Brief of 
Respondents at 10. However, while conceding many bookkeepers are salaried, Respondents 
focus too much on examples not applicable under our facts. Certainly, Respondents do not 
suggest any professional paid on an hourly basis is necessarily an employee. Petitioners' 
argument on this point is simply, under the facts of this case, the profit or loss measure is not 
a clear indicator of an employment relationship based on the other factors. 
Fifth, is whether Harris advertised his services. Again, Harris specifically testified his 
primary means of promoting his freelance services was by word-of-mouth advertising. R. at 
50(40:44-45, 45:3-16). Incredibly, Respondents contend Petitioners' recitation of the 
evidence from the record is "inconsistent with the facts," Brief of Respondents at 11, and 
then just five sentences later speculate once again as to Harris' motive, thus creating 
Respondents' own "version" of the "facts." It is true, the Court must remember this is not a 
case where Harris has sought unemployment benefits only to learn Petitioners neglected to 
pay per the Act. Rather, this is an on-going relationship in which, even Respondents' own 
field investigator clearly documented Harris is free to "do other work if he chooses." R. at 
14. Harris utilized methods of advertising he thought adequate. The effectiveness, or lack 
3 
thereof, of Harris' marketing abilities certainly cannot be determinative of an employment 
relationship. 
The sixth factor under engagement in independent trade is whether the individual had 
a license. There is but one resolution of this issue: Harris had no license because no license 
is required, to perform 'bookkeeping services. R at 50(35:25-27); 52. 
The seventh and final factor is whether "the individual files self-employment and 
other business tax forms " Utah Admin. Code R994-204-303(2)(b)(vii). Again, this 
factor is overwIlelmingly in favor of Harris' status as engaged in an independent profession 
because it is undisputed Harris routinely filed Schedule SE forms reporting self-employment 
income. 
Thus, under the seven factors identified for considering engagement in an independent 
trade, the substantial weight of 1:1 le i ecord e\ idence weighs against Respondents' 
determination that Harris is Petitioners' employee. Accordingly, the Department's July 31, 
2000 decision that Harris is Petitioners' employee should be reversed. 
B. C'liiili'iil or direction 
The second prong of Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-204(3)(b) focuses hether the 
individual is "free from control or direction over the means of performance." Respondents 
contend the first three of eight factors, namely (1) instructions, (2) training, and (3) pace or 
sequence, "are nol applicable to ;i east; involving peoplo who aie lured to perform support 
services." Brief of Respondents at 14. Perhaps this is because these factors undeniably 
4 
indicate Harris is not Petitioners' employee. Specifically, Petitioners provided Harris no 
instruction regarding the performance of his services, see R. at 13, 15 & 50(58:12-15), 
provided no training to Harris, R. at 13, 15, and there was no evidence Petitioners influenced 
the pace or sequence of Harris' work. Thus, all three factors weigh decidedly against the 
Department's July 31, 2000, decision. 
The fourth control or direction factor is whether services are required on the 
employer's premises. Harris did testify Moffat "required" him to be at work from nine in the 
morning until six at ni^ht However, in providing freelance services, this is entirely 
consistent with Harris' pattern and practice. Specifically, Harris prefers to perform services 
on site because doing so avoids the need to shuttle numerous client files to and from his 
home office. R at 50(46:37-39). Further, Moffat indicated Harris was "free to come and go. 
.. if he chooses." R. al i i. 
The fifth control or direction factor is whether the employer requires services be 
performed personally. Harris indecisively testified it was his "understanding" he was to 
perform services personally, but he never pushed the issue because he has no employees he 
could send in his place. R. at 50(54:1-18); R. at 13 (responding to personal service query: "I 
think so though never was discussed."). The definitive record evidence comes from Moffat's 
negative answer to the Department investigator's question whether he required Harris 
personally perform his services. R. at 15. 
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The sixth control or direction factor considers the duration of the relationship between 
the parties. Harris has performed services for Petitioners since 1996. During this time 
period Harris performed similar services for others, albeit infrequently. R. at 12; 34; 
50(17:16-38; 38:25-35; and 39:22-45). 
The seventh measure of control or direction is \\ hethci the incJn iilual lutd set work 
hours. As set forth in detail in the Brief of Petitioners, numerous factors weigh against an 
employment relationship in this regard, not the least of which is Moffat's indication Harris 
could col lie arid go as he pleased R at h 1- & 15. 
The eighth control or direction factor considers method of payment. Petitioners paid 
Harris twice a month. This payment "schedule" alone is not sufficient to overcome the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence under the seven other factors demonstrating Harris was 
not subject to Petitioners' control or direction. 
Finally, Respondents string cite a host of cases noting "[e]mployer-employee 
relationships were found" therein. See Brief of Respondents at 20. No explanation is given 
of the facts of these cases, the reasoning relied oii iti deciding the cases, nor how they differ 
in substance from the instant matter. See e.g. Bigfoot's, Inc. v. Industrial Comm % 710 P.2d 
180, 181 (Utah 1985) (deciding case under now-inapplicable Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-
22(j)(5)(B), which considered whether "the service is either outside the usual course of the 
business for which the service is performed or that the service is performed oi itside all the 
places of business of the enterprise for which the service is performed"); Superior 
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Cablevision Installers, Inc. v. Industrial Comm% 688 P 2d 444, 446-47 (Utah 1984) 
(deciding case under former Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-22(j)(5)(A) - (C)). As stated in State v. 
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998): 
Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) [of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure] requires 
not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and 
reasoned analysis based on that authority. We have previously stated that this 
court is not a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of 
argument and research." 
Id. at 305 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Because Respondents fail to either 
develop the sti ii igofcitationssetfbr ,-. i
 { v reasoned analysis'thereof, 
this Court should not look to the string-cited authority for resolution of the pending matter. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the Utah Administrative Code factors, for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 35A-
4-204(3), the substantial weight of the evidence supports a conclusion Harris is engaged in 
an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business of the same nature as 
involved in the contract of hire for services. Further, under the Administrative Code factors, 
the substantial weight of the record evidence supports the conclusion Harris was free from 
Petitioners' control or direction over the means of performance of his services. Because the 
substantial weight of the record evidence does not support the Respondents' factual findings, 
the Respondents' conclusion that Harris is Petitioners' employee is an arbitrary and 
erroneous application of the law to the facts in this case. Accordingly, Petitioners 
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respectfully request this Court reverse the Department's determination that Harris is an 
employee and subject to the terms of the Act. 
DATED this \*~ day of August 2001. 
WINDER & HASLAM 
JOHK/WARREN MA Y ^ 
Atjopneys for Petitioners 
8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
It is hereby certified that on this \ ~~ day of August, 2001,1 caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of Petitioners, by the method indicated below, to the 
following: 
Suzan Pixton 
140 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 45244 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0244 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
2462\012\Appeal\Reply Brief of Petitioner 
9 
